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INTRODUCTION 
 The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) celebrates its 
twentieth anniversary in 2015 and has proved very successful in 
strengthening the contours of the international economic order and 
promoting reforms in a number of member countries.1 One can find 
abundant literature on amendments made by different countries and 
sectors related to the law, the organization, or the Dispute Settlement 
Body (“DSB”) decisions.2 Indeed, almost all of the 460-plus trade 
disputes 3  that have arisen since 1995 have been resolved in 
accordance with WTO law.4 Unsurprisingly, Bruce Wilson, former 

1 .  The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established on January 1, 1995, 
replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), under the terms of the 
Marrakesh Agreement. This international organization serves as a common institutional 
framework for trade among its 160 Member States, and as provided for under this agreement. 
See Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited 
Aug. 2014). Its work consists of facilitating “the implementation, administration and 
operation, and furthering the objectives” of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement] (concerning several fields of international trade, 
such as goods, services, and intellectual property rights).  
2. For instance, in 1994 the United States passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act, 
which implemented several changes to domestic patent law required by the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs Agreement”). See Adam Isaac 
Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest for World Patent 
Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 374 (2002). After the US claim, the 
WTO ordered Europe to amend its banana import rules. See Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas, 
Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 667 (1999) [hereinafter Trachtman]. 
The TRIPs Agreement compelled India to amend its patent regime in a substantial manner 
since 1999. See K. D. Raju, WTO–TRIPS Obligations and Patent Amendments in India: A 
Critical Stocktaking, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 226, 227 (2004). South Africa’s anti-dumping 
law and practice incorporate WTO tenets. See Lonias Ndlovu, An Assessment of the WTO 
Compliance of the Recent Regulatory Regime of South Africa’s Dumping and Anti-Dumping 
Law, 5 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 29, 30 (2010). 
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].  
4 . See generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s 
Supremacy in the International Trade Order – A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). In fact, the WTO is so 
successful that WTO interpretations are being increasingly imported into investment 
arbitrations. This trend has generated some doubts because investment and trade regulation are 
not part of the same system, and the birth, growth, and evolution of the concepts may be 
substantially different. Jürgen Kurtz supported the view that arbitral tribunals, through their 
multiple misunderstandings of the WTO acquis, have actually produced greater incoherence 
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Director of the WTO Legal Affairs Division, observed that in almost 
all cases a Member found to be in violation of its WTO obligations 
would later comply with WTO law. 5  After all, Professor Louis 
Henkin rightly observed that “almost all nations observe almost all 
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations 
almost all of the time.”6  
 However, the key issue of compliance with WTO law is 
always approached in a vertical manner. The law of the WTO is 
superior to domestic legal systems, and Members comply with 
international trade law because they have expressed their willingness 
to be bound. Much of the reflection has addressed the nature, i.e., the 
binding character of WTO law. A wealth of analyses has focused on 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”).7 Indeed, the DSU is 
one of the central achievements of the Uruguay Round negotiations.8  
 This Article deconstructs the WTO obligation of conformity 
enshrined in  Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement, demonstrating 
that this key provision is not a mere interface between international 
and domestic law. In fact, the obligation of conformity is the source 
of a process of compliance which, although more modest than usual 
law of international responsibility, has proven to be effective in 
securing final compliance. Deconstructing the obligation of 
conformity helps to explain and demystify the high level of 

and inconsistency in the case of the National Treatment standard. See Jürgen Kurtz, The Use 
and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor–State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 (2009).  
5. Wilson indicated that in the same article that in ninety percent of the adopted reports, 
one or more violations of the WTO obligations have been found by panels and/or the Appellate 
Body. See Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute 
Settlement Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 397, 398 (2007); see also 
WORLDTRADELAW.NET, http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/implementaverage.php (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (providing very useful statistics, in particular the average 
implementation time period). 
6. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979); see also, Abram Chayes & 
Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 177 (1993). 
7. See, e.g., PETROS C. MAVROIDIS & THOMAS COTTIER, THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO 1-2 (Petros 
C. Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier eds., 2003); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO 
Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 399 (1998); YANG GUOHUA, BRYAN 
MERCURIO & LI YONGJIE, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: A DETAILED 
INTERPRETATION (2005); see also Dan Sarooshi, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the World 
Trade Organization: What Role for Systemic Values in the Resolution of International 
Economic Disputes?, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 445, 446 (2014). 
8. See Dispute Settlement Body, Overview of the State of Play of WTO Disputes: Annual 
Report (2013), WT/DSB/61/Add.1 (Nov. 1, 2013). 
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compliance with WTO law while significantly contributing to the 
understanding of why and how States comply with international law. 
This Article contributes to the understanding of why States 
comply with international law, specifically WTO law. It focuses on a 
key provision of the WTO agreement, Article XVI:4, which plays a 
key role—and crystalizes other processes—in inducing compliance. 
This provision reads “Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its 
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations 
as provided in the annexed Agreements.”  
The significance of this provision was underscored by John H. 
Jackson9 and is often cited but rarely commented upon—something 
this Article intends to remedy. 10  The obligation enshrined in this 
provision is not the mere driving force of States compliance with 
international trade law. WTO compliance—through the general 
obligation of conformity—is a complex process. Professor Harold 
Koh offered a general theory of why States comply with international 
law by showing that transnational actors obey international law as a 
result of repeated interaction with other actors in the transnational 
legal process.11 In deconstructing the WTO obligation of conformity, 
this Article unveils the complex and dynamic process of compliance. 

9. Insofar as it can serve as a basis for the notion that the purpose of the Dispute 
Settlement (“DS”) procedure is to establish an international law obligation for the Member 
States to comply with the results of the interpretations and applications made in the DS 
process. John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to "Buy Out"?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 112 (2004).  For a 
fascinating debate which preceded Jackson’s article, see Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO 
Dispute Understanding Mechanism: Less is More, 90 AM J. INT’L L. 416 (1996); see also John 
H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of 
Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 60–64 (1997); Warren Schwartz & Alan Sykes, The 
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade 
Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 179 (2002).  
10. See, e.g., Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Reports, supra note 9, at 112; Rafael 
Leal-Arcas, Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes: Going Regional or 
Global?, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 n. 2 (2007); Sarooshi, supra note 7, at 459 n. 65; Laura 
Spitz, The Gift of Enron: An Opportunity to Talk About Capitalism, Equality, Globalization, 
and the Promise of a North-American Charter of Fundamental Rights, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 
379 n. 262 (2005); James D. Wilets, A Unified Theory of International Law, the State, and the 
Individual: Transnational Legal Harmonization in the Context of Economic and Legal 
Globalization, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 753, 806 n. 149 (2010); Elena A. Wilson, Russia in the 
WTO: Will It Give Full Direct Effect to WTO Law?, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & 
DEV. L. J. 325, 326 (2014).  
11. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2656 (1997). 
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 Part I outlines in what fashion conformity is a fundamental 
obligation of the multilateral trading system, which is two-fold in 
nature and places emphasis on the high degree of similarity between 
national and international law. Part II then discusses how its place in 
the normative corpus makes it a principle of higher importance, which 
not only precludes the invocation of domestic laws (VC 27) but 
further requires a positive act. When put into practice, the WTO 
obligation confirms its importance in light of its wide scope of 
application. However, although all norms of domestic law are subject 
to compliance, the ways and means employed by Members remain 
out of the scope of the obligation. Equally important to understand the 
impact of the obligation is its necessary combination with another 
provision. Part III examines that, although demanding in its reach 
while flexible in the way it is respected, the conformity obligation 
may engender to litigation. Part IV argues that compliance is not left 
to the appreciation of each Member but attributed to the DSB which 
plays a key role—direct and indirect—in the compliance process.12 
During this stage the shape and substance of the obligation are 
modified, giving birth to a secondary obligation to comply. More 
precise and subject to a deadline, and sometimes incorporating some 
intrusive guidance, the new secondary obligation gives a new 
opportunity to comply. The DSB is in fact a restatement of the initial 
obligation of compliance without imposing a sanction which would 
cover the period during which an internal rule existed in opposition to 
WTO law. Part V explains that the obligation, derived as formulated 
by the DSB, does not extinguish the obligation of Article XVI:4 of 
the WTO Agreement but reformulates it in a different way, giving it a 
precise nature. The binding character of the secondary obligation is 
complemented by a mechanism of counter-measure which largely 
contributes to securing full compliance. 
I. SEQUENCING THE WTO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY  
This Part provides a sequencing of the conformity obligation 
structure with the aim of identifying the source of conformity in the 

12 . The creation of an obligatory Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”), whose 
rulings are binding within the WTO framework, has modified the entire international 
economic structure. The DSB makes the WTO “an integration organization, rooted in 
contemporary international law. In simple terms, the WTO’s sophisticated dispute settlement 
mechanism makes it a distinctive organization.” Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and Its 
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 969, 970 (2006). 
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WTO system and offering a general definition of conformity. Section 
A shows that the conformity is a quest for similarity across national 
and international legal orders. In this respect, the conformity principle 
is better described as a centripetal force which creates a movement 
and assumes a dynamic role in the compliance process. Section B 
critically analyzes the conformity requirements that allows one to 
identify two complementary obligations which form the WTO law of 
compliance.  
A. Quest of Similarity: Transforming National Law 
All WTO Members are bound by the obligation to adapt their 
domestic law to WTO law.13  This obligation expresses Members’ 
willingness to ensure that international trade law is enforced 
effectively on behalf of those who have undertaken to implement it. 
Also, the obligation to conform is justified only insofar as its primary 
object is to avoid any risk of conflict between two legal systems, i.e., 
the WTO system and Members’ domestic systems, as well as serious 
disputes among various Members of the organization. The WTO 
Agreement makes it clear that, from the perspective of the WTO, its 
legal system prevails over domestic law. Article XVI:4 requires 
unequivocally that each Member shall ensure the conformity of its 
laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obligations 
under the WTO agreements. However, Article XVI:4 of the WTO 
Agreement requires “conformity” without defining it, probably 
because conventional wisdom is sufficient to grasp the essence of the 
word. This, however, raises an issue of interpretation. 
 In its plain meaning, “conformity” refers to the “compliance 
with standards, rules, or laws” and requires “similarity in form or 
type.”14 The compliance is “the action or fact of complying with a 

13. The “WTO law” is made of a number of agreements. Annex 1, the most extensive, 
consists of GATT 1994 and its 12 side agreements (Annex 1A); the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (“GATS”), its instruments, and the Members’ schedules (Annex 1B); and 
the TRIPs Agreement (Annex 1C). Further annexes comprise the DSU (Annex 2), the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3) and the plurilateral agreements (Annex 4). See Julien 
Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules Through Negotiations and 
Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, 21 U. 
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2007). 
14 . OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 366 (3d ed. 2012). The origin of the word 
“conformity” is to be found in the late Middle English transposing Old French “conformité” 
and late Latin “conformitas,” both originating from the Latin verb “conformare” which means 
“to form, fashion.” Id. 
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wish or command” and “the state or fact of according with or meeting 
rules or standards15.” Meanwhile the similarity is the state or fact of 
being similar, i.e., of “having a resemblance in appearance, character, 
or quantity, without being identical.”16 Since the conformity does not 
require identity, it means that domestic laws do not have to be 
identical, i.e., “similar in every detail; exactly alike” as the WTO 
norms.  
When the Appellate Body was called upon to interpret the 
conformity principle, it also relied on the ordinary meaning stressing 
the demanding nature of the obligation. The Appellate Body stated 
that “much more is required before one thing may be regarded as 
‘conform[ing] to’ another: the former must ‘comply with,’ ‘yield or 
show compliance’ with the latter. The reference of ‘conform to’ is to 
‘correspondence in form of manner,’ to ‘compliance with’ or 
‘acquiescence,’ to ‘follow[ing] in form of nature.’”17  
This first attempt to define the ordinary meaning of conformity 
helps to interpret the WTO concept of conformity and also to identify 
the key practical elements of conformity. First, conformity requires an 
action by the Member States who must comply with the law of the 
WTO. Second, compliance requires reaching similarity, which is a 
requirement for domestic laws to resemble in appearance, contents, 
and character to international law. Conformity is a demanding 
requirement which, however, does not extend to a requirement of 
formal identity. Third, from a normative perspective, WTO 
compliance is a process whose goal is to bring national laws to a 
certain threshold of resemblance with WTO law. In the compliance 
process, the WTO conformity obligation acts as a centripetal force 
which “is that by which bodies are drawn or impelled, or in any way 
tend, towards a point as to a centre.”18  Fourth, using the physics 
metaphor again, Member States are like satellites in orbit around the 
WTO; the centripetal force is supplied by the conformity requirement 
which acts like gravity. The requirement of similarity with WTO law 

15. “COMPLIANCE”   in   OXFORD   DICTIONARIES   OF   U.S.   ENGLISH   http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english. 
16 . “SIMILAR”   IN   OXFORD   DICTIONARIES   OF   U.S.   ENGLISH   http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_english (emphasis added). 
17. Appellate  Body  Report,  EC  Measures  Affecting  Meat  and  Meat  Products 
(Hormones), ¶ 163, WT/DS26AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998); 1 THE NEW SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 477 (6th ed. 2007). 
18. ISAAC  NEWTON,  THE  PRINCIPIA:  MATHEMATICAL  PRINCIPLES  OF  NATURAL  
PHILOSOPHY 10 (2010).  
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also results in the logical deduction that gradually all 161 WTO 
Members should have similar national laws on trade measures. 19  
At a more conceptual and general level, conformity, as defined 
by the WTO system, is an obligatory process in which each Member 
State has to transform its internal law in accordance with the rules 
contained in the various WTO agreements. 20  In such a process, 
aiming at conformity is obligatory. In a nutshell, by ratifying the 
WTO agreements, each and all Member States agree to limit their 
autonomy and to exercise their normative power only in a particular 
direction.  
B. Duplication: Primary and Secondary Obligation to Comply 
 Since the principle expressed by Article XVI:4 is included in 
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which forms the very basis of 
the organization, the conformity obligation applies to all other WTO 
agreements even if those agreements do not refer to it specifically.21 
In addition, under Article XVI:3, if there is “a conflict between a 
provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of the Multilateral 
Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to 
the extent of the conflict.”22 As a result, one can deduce that Article 

19. As concluded by Wang:  
in the end, for the purpose of complying with the WTO requirements, the 
approach, policy and style of legislation of Members will gradually become 
unified and have common or similar features. The WTO’s impact on the 
substantive provisions of laws and regulations of its Members was intended by 
the fathers of the WTO. Its effect on other aspects of legislation may not have 
been foreseen. 
GUIGUO WANG, RADIATING IMPACT OF WTO ON ITS MEMBERS’ LEGAL SYSTEM: THE 
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 349, 352 (2010). 
20. Internal law encompasses all the normative acts that produce a legal effect, including 
judiciary decisions. Indeed, a WTO Member “bears responsibility for acts of all its 
departments of government, including its judiciary.” Without doubt, “the judiciary is a state 
organ and even if an act or omission derives from a WTO Member's judiciary, it is 
nevertheless still attributable to that WTO Member.” See Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Japan, ¶ 182, WT/DS322/AB/RW (Aug. 8, 2009). 
21. The Appellate Body states that “Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement provides that 
‘[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements’, which include the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement.” Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 301, WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). 
22. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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XVI:4 is a rule of higher rank than the provisions of the agreements 
listed in the Annexes.  
Also, WTO Agreement Article XVI:4 is a general clause which 
is reaffirmed by other provisions contained in specific agreements 
whose observance calls for the adaptation of domestic law. For 
instance, Article 18.4 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement requires each 
Member to “take all necessary steps, of a general or particular 
character, to ensure, no later than the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreements for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with the provisions of the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement.”23 Even if some terms of the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
(“ADA”) Article 18.4 differ from those of Article XVI:4, they are 
identical as far as the basic obligation of ensuring the conformity of a 
Member’s laws, regulations, and administrative procedures—found in 
both Articles—is concerned. Such identity is validated by the 
Appellate Body (“AB”), which basically, gives the same meaning to 
the specific provisions which simply reiterates the general clause of 
Article XVI:4. 24  
Finally, if a provision of an “annexed Agreement” is breached, a 
violation of Article XVI:4 immediately occurs. 25  As a result, the 
inclusion of the conformity requirement in the WTO agreement, the 
supreme rank of this agreement in the WTO normative corpus, and 
the fact that any violation of WTO rules immediately results into a 

23. See Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Annex 1A art. 8(2)(a), reprinted in 
1 LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 261, 269 (Joseph F. Dennin 
ed., 1995) (“Each Member shall ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with 
the provisions of this Agreement.”). See also Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Apr. 12, 
1979), GATT B.I.S.D (26th Supp.) at 188 (1979) (“Each government accepting or acceding to 
this Agreement shall ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, 
the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of 
this Agreement.”). 
24. “With respect to Article XVI:4 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, we note 
that, if some of the terms of Article XVI:4 differ from those of Article 18.4, they are identical 
and unqualified as far as the basic obligation of ensuring the conformity of laws, regulations 
and administrative procedures found in both articles is concerned.” Panel Report, United States 
– Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 – Complaint by Japan, ¶ 6.287, WT/DS162/R (May 29, 2000). 
25. In this respect,  it was logically deduced that “[A]n additional finding on whether the 
same measure is also in breach of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement would not be 
necessary in order to resolve the dispute between the parties. It was already noted that a Panel 
does not need to examine all legal claims made by a complaining party, but just those ‘which 
must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.’”  Panel Report, Chile - 
Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products - 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, ¶ 17.170, WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006).  
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violation of Article XVI:4, make the conformity requirement a 
primary obligation, i.e., an obligation which is at the core of the WTO 
legal system. 
If a Member does not comply with WTO rules, this may give 
rise to a dispute. A dispute arises when a Member State believes that 
another Member State is violating an agreement or a commitment that 
it has made to the WTO.26 A violation complaint will succeed when 
the respondent fails to carry out its obligations under the WTO 
agreements resulting, directly or indirectly, in nullification or 
impairment of a benefit accruing to the complainant under these 
agreements. If such an argument can be established before a Panel 
and the AB, it means that these two conditions are satisfied, and thus 
the defendant will have to change its legislation. 27  The Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) then appears as the second element 
to ensure the conformity of domestic law with the WTO prescriptions.  
When the DSB adopts a decision to end a dispute, the primary 
obligation contained in the WTO agreement is redefined and 
transformed into a secondary obligation to comply. The secondary 
obligation to comply is conceptually distinct from the primary 
obligation to comply. They both have the same aim; however, they 
differ in the form, content, and enforcement. 
 This Section has provided a preliminary deconstruction of the 
obligation to comply. It has demonstrated that, firstly, the WTO 
system is exerting an influence on domestic systems, which have to 

26. See, e.g., Julien Chaisse, The WTO Seals Products Dispute - Traditional Hunting, 
Public Morals and Technical Barriers to Trade, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 79, 80-
82 (2011). 
27. In practice, the first of these two conditions, viz., violation, plays a much more 
important role than the second condition, viz., nullification or impairment of a benefit, does—
this is because nullification or impairment is “presumed” to exist whenever a violation has 
been established. Members may also initiate “non-violation complaints,” relying on “non-
violation nullification or impairment and unavailability of benefits based on reasonable 
expectations.” This argument might apply, for example, where a Member’s laws and 
regulations conform to a WTO obligation, yet the Member systematically refuses to apply 
those laws and regulations, thereby nullifying or impairing a benefit expected to accrue 
(whether directly or indirectly) under WTO law. See Frieder Roessler, The Concept of 
Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade Organization, in 11 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, STUDIES 
IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 125, 141-42 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). See 
generally Thomas Cottier & Schefer Krista Nadakavukaren, Non-Violation Complaints in 
WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future, in 11 INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT  SYSTEM, STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW 145–183 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). 
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transform in order to reach some degree of similarity—with the WTO 
and, consequently, across them. Secondly, the influence is due to a 
centripetal force which is formed by the general obligation of 
conformity—primary conformity obligation—complemented by the 
rulings of the DSB—secondary conformity obligation. Subsequent 
developments will focus on each aspect of the primary and secondary 
obligation to comply in order to fully deconstruct the contribution of 
the conformity obligation with the WTO compliance process. 
II. COMPARING WTO CONFORMITY TO PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE 
 As prescribed by customary international law and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), States are obliged to 
perform the treaty obligations.28  This fundamental principle is the 
cornerstone of classic international law.29 It means that the parties are 
bound by the contract that they have concluded and they cannot, 
therefore, shirk the obligations that they have thereby accepted. This 
is an indication of the predominance of willingness and, more 
importantly, of consent as the material source of law and, 
consequently, where formal sources are concerned, the predominance 
of treaties over national laws. Section A explains that in WTO law, 
compliance obligation fully incorporates the classic rule of pacta sunt 
servanda. Section B, however, points out that the WTO conformity 
obligation also imposes a positive obligation to comply, i.e., to enact 
the law. 
A. Congruence of Obligations’ Scopes 
 As a basic principle of civil law and public international law, 
pacta sunt servanda must be based on good faith as underscored by 

28. In public international law, the implementation of treaties is an obligation under 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which insists on the execution of 
a treaty in good faith and in compliance with the classic rule pacta sunt servanda (i.e., 
“agreements must be kept”). See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“Every treaty in force is binding 
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”)  
29. This is generally understood as a moral obligation to keep a promise, rather than just 
a legal obligation. “According to this interpretation of the pacta maxim, then, the role of the 
law is to provide a state sanction for moral norms. This point, so obvious to civil lawyers, is 
much less so to anyone trained in the Holmesian tradition.” Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt 
Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405, 406 (1994); see DAVID J. BEDERMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (3d ed. 2010). 
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the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in the 1974 Nuclear Tests 
judgment.30 Earlier, in 1932, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ”) logically considered that domestic legislation could 
not be invoked to justify the non-enforcement of an international 
obligation.31 In this regard, the State Constitution, the supreme norm 
in a domestic legal order, cannot be invoked in such a case, either, as 
stated in another PCIJ judgment.32  
 According to Article 26 of the VCLT, “every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith,” or else States can be found to be in violation of the treaty.33 
Tracking the obligation of good faith performance is a general rule of 
treaty interpretation, which implies that treaties must be construed in 
good faith, and their interpretations must take into account “any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.” 34  Under international law, a State is obliged not to 
frustrate or undermine the object and purpose of a treaty when it is a 
signatory. The PCIJ’s jurisprudence has, to some extent, completed 
this general obligation stipulated in Article 27 of the VCLT, that is, “a 
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty.”35  
 The WTO follows interpretations of public international law 
as explained by the arbitrators in the 2003 Canada – Export Credits 
dispute:  
Pursuant to the general principle of international law pacta sunt 
servanda, as embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (1969), States are not only presumed to 
perform their treaty obligations in good faith, they are expected 

30 . “One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and confidence are 
inherent in international co-operation, in particular in an age when this Co-operation in many 
fields is becoming increasingly essential.” Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgement, 1974 I.C.J 
268, ¶ 46 (Dec. 20). 
31. See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Judgment, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 46 (June 7). 
32. See Access to‚ or Anchorage in‚ the port of Danzig‚ of Polish War Vessels, Advisory 
Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J (ser. A/B) No. 43 (Dec. 11). 
33. Vienna Convention, supra note 28. 
34. Id. at art. 31(3)(c). In determining the purpose and context of the treaty, suitable 
recourse may be made to the preamble and annexes of the treaty. Id. at art. 31(2). 
35 . To ensure consistency in State behavior, the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, in a number of cases, affirmed the principle that a “State cannot invoke its municipal 
law as a reason for failure to fulfill its international obligation.” See I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel 
in International Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 468, 473 (1958). 
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and obliged to do so. We also note that Article 27 of the same 
Vienna Convention specifies that obligations under internal law 
cannot excuse States from complying with their international 
obligations.36  
And this interpretation also stands in 1998’s Anti-Dumping 
Investigation Regarding Portland Cement case in which the Panel 
concluded that “the argument that Guatemala could not have initiated 
the investigation until after it had notified Mexico, pursuant to 
provisions of its own Constitution and law, does not affect our 
conclusion in this regard.”37  
 Pacta sunt servanda is, however, not an absolute, rigid and 
formalistic principle under which States must in any and all 
circumstances strictly obey to the letter promises that they have made 
under the WTO agreements no matter what the content of those 
promises, no matter how severely circumstances have changed, or no 
matter what dire effects obeisance might have on the State’s 
operations or existence. 38  States may on some occasions escape 
liability for breaching their promises if their defenses are determined 
to be applicable as a matter of law, such as the defenses of necessity, 
which has been at the center of a number of recent investment 

36. Decision by the Arbitrators, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for 
Regional Aircraft, ¶ 3.104, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Canada – Export 
Credit and Loan Guarantees]. 
37. Furthermore, “[i]n acceding to the WTO, Guatemala undertook to be bound by 
Article 5.5 when initiating anti-dumping investigations. Any failure to respect Article 5.5 may 
not be justified on the basis of inconsistent provisions of domestic law. Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement explicitly states that each Member shall ensure the conformity of its law, 
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed 
Agreements.” See Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation 
Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, § 7.38, WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998). 
38. As explained by Jennings:  
“[i]t is wrong to suppose that pacta sunt servanda must apply tout court in all 
cases or in none. No mature law of contract is absolute, and few principles of 
law are to be understood without qualification. . . . Is it not likely that the true 
position is that the principle functions, as it does in the case of treaties, as a 
presumption: a presumption leaning against the existence of any right of 
unilateral termination; but which, like all presumptions, may in some cases be 
successfully rebutted? Thus understood it may be found both to fit readily into 
the pattern of existing law and to explain it.” 
R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 177 
(1961). 
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arbitrations, force majeure,39 ultra vires,40 and fundamental change of 
circumstances.  
 In WTO law, exceptions take the form of waivers or general 
exceptions. Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement therefore provides 
that the Ministerial Conference may decide in exceptional 
circumstances to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by WTO 
law. Such a decision is to be taken formally by casting a vote of three 
fourths of the Members. Consensus is required for waivers in respect 
of any obligation subject to a transition period or a period for staged 
implementation. 41 In practice, all decisions are prepared and taken by 
consensus in the General Council. Article IX:3 of the WTO 
Agreement extends Article XXV:5 of the GATT 1947 and makes it 
clear that waivers may be adopted with regard to any obligation and 
agreement under the WTO legal framework. Waivers are of practical 
importance.42 They have been requested by Members several times 
and were subsequently granted by the Contracting Parties under the 
GATT 1947 and now by the Ministerial Conference under the 
WTO.43 

39. State necessity is the force majeure of international law. It permits the contravention 
of state obligations when absolutely necessary. In those cases, the exceptional circumstances 
preclude the wrongfulness of the act. Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Addendum to 
the 8th Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/318/Add. 5-7 [hereinafter Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility] 
(Force majeure describes the situation “where an unforeseen and unavoidable external 
circumstance, an irresistible ‘force’ beyond the control of the subject taking the action, makes 
it materially impossible for that subject to act in conformity with an international obligation”). 
40. Because of a lack of competent institutions that can deal with such ultra vires acts, 
international law relies on such doctrines as protest and non-recognition. IAN BROWNLIE, 
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART I 26-27 (1983); see 
Theodor Meron, State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 
PROC. 372, 375-76 (1989). For a Japanese civil law scholar's view that ultra vires does not 
apply to States because a State can be liable internationally even for those acts which it 
undertakes in violation of its own laws, see Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as 
Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29 DENV. 
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 261, 277-78 (2001). 
41. WTO Agreement supra note 1, at art. IX(3) (“In exceptional circumstances, the 
Ministerial Conference may decide to waive an obligation imposed on a Member by this 
Agreement or any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. . . .”). For an interesting contribution 
to analyzing the potential of the WTO waiver as a legal instrument to reconcile conflicting 
norms and interests, see Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO 
for Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615, 645 
(2009). 
42. See D. Marinberg, GATT/WTO Waivers: “Exceptional Circumstances” as Applied to 
the Lomé Waiver, 19 B. U. INT’L L. J. 129 (2001). 
43 . One of the most important waivers ever was the one granted to the European 
Commission (“EC”) in relation to the preferential treatment for bananas originating in the 
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 WTO conformity may also not apply if an exception is 
applicable. The WTO system regulates a number of specific or 
general exceptions. 44  In addition to the exceptions of the general 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions set out in GATT Article XI:2,45 
one can identify specific exceptions in the TRIPs agreement,46 such as 
the doctrine of fair use exceptions. 47  Article 3 of the TRIPs 
Agreement allows for existing exceptions provided for in other 
relevant intellectual property conventions.48 Articles XVI and XVII of 

African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (“ACP”) countries pursuant to the Fourth 
Lomé Convention. It became necessary to waive the most-favored-nation (“MFN”) obligation 
under Article I:1 of the GATT, as the agreement did not comply with the requirements of 
Article XXIV of the GATT, but was indispensable to avoid disruption of production in and 
exports from ACP countries. Subsequently, the question arose, and was eventually brought 
before a panel and the Appellate Body, whether the EC regime was covered by the waiver with 
regard to preferential treatment of ACP bananas. The report of the Appellate Body indicates 
how carefully the text of a waiver is analyzed and assessed. See Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R 509 (Sept. 9, 
1997). 
44. For a commentary on the regime of Article XX of the GATT, see Julien Chaisse, 
Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections – 
General Exceptions Clause as a Forced Perspective, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332 (2013). For 
more specific aspects of the WTO exceptions, see also BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. 
KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 441 (2001) 
(discussing GATT Article XX’s application to human rights and labor standards); Glenn 
Weiser, The Clean Development Mechanism Versus the World Trade Organization: Can Free-
Market Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 531, 553-55, 583-85 (1999) (discussing the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's tendencies 
to interpret Article XX narrowly and to respond negatively towards unilateral trade measures 
adopted to protect the global commons). 
45. Article XI:2 of the GATT 1994 gained some importance with regard to agricultural 
products as it excludes them, under certain conditions, from the general prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions (“QRs”). Under the GATT 1947, various panels were called upon to 
interpret Article XI:2(c). Under the WTO, with the conclusion of the Agreement on 
Agriculture, this paragraph has lost its relevance. 
46 . On the role of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally Julien Chaisse & Puneeth 
Nagaraj, Changing Lanes – Trade, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights, 36 HASTINGS 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223 (2014). 
47. The TRIPs Agreement recognises the doctrine of fair use exceptions in Article 17 
(copyright) and Article 30 (patents). These provisions allow governments to make limited 
exceptions for public policy reasons. These provisions have not yet been fully explored and 
refined in jurisprudence. See Panel Report, US – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, 
WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), in which a panel had to deal with two US copyright provisions 
exempting certain transmissions from copyright infringement. The panel focused mainly on 
Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement in deciding whether these exceptions were permissible. 
When interpreting Article 13, the panel failed to make explicit reference to the objectives and 
purposes of the TRIPs Agreement as embodied in Articles 7 and 8. 
48. See  J.H.  Reichman,  Universal  Minimum  Standards  of  Intellectual  Property 
Protection Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW. 345, 349-50 
(1995) (discussing authorization for Members to unilaterally offer “more extensive protection 
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the GATS 49  allow for far-reaching individualized exemptions and 
qualifications set out in the Members’ specific schedules.50 Further 
GATT51 exceptions are contained in Article XII (balance-of-payments 
safeguard measures),52 Article XX (general exceptions),53 and Article 
XXI (national security exceptions) 54  of the GATT 1994. These 
exceptions are frequently utilized to pursue other legitimate policy 
goals. WTO conformity is congruent to pacta sunt servanda rules. If 
there is no valid exception—in the form of a waiver or Article XX—
Members are obliged to perform treaty obligations. 
B. WTO Additional Requirements 
 Whereas WTO jurisprudence did not clarify the exact sense of 
Article XVI:4, the European Union stated in the Sections 301–310 of 
the Trade Act of 1974 case that “Article XVI:4 must be interpreted to 
impose requirements with respect to domestic law additional to the 
requirements that arise already from the substantive WTO obligations 

than is required by this Agreement” for intellectual property rights, so long as, in doing so, 
other TRIPs Agreement provisions are not contravened, and the “national treatment” 
provisions of the main international conventions are honored); see also Joost Pauwelyn, The 
Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. 
INT'L DISP. SETTLEMENT 389, 392 (2010). 
49. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 
1B on Financial Services. 
50. On GATS exceptions, see Wei Wang, On the Relationship Between Market Access 
and National Treatment Under the GATS, 46 INT'L LAW. 1045, 1053 (2012). 
51. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187. 
52. GATT Article XII permits a WTO Member to increase a bound tariff in order to 
address a shortfall in its balance-of-payments position. Deborah E. Siegel, Legal Aspects of the 
IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTO Agreements, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 561, 571 (2002) . 
53. In the practice of WTO law, Article XX of the GATT 1994 is one of the most 
important provisions. It justifies deviations from other rules, in particular, but not exclusively, 
from the principle of national treatment and from the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. 
See MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 787 (2d ed. 2006); see 
also Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. 
WORLD TRADE 37, 45 (1991). 
54. See Peter Lindsay, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant 
Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003) (“This exception confers a potentially broad grant 
of authority, because the GATT does not define critical terms such as ‘considers necessary,’ 
‘essential security interests,’ ‘time of war,’ and ‘emergency in international relations.’ 
Consequently, the scope of the ‘war’ and ‘emergency’ exception in Article XXI is not readily 
discernible. Similarly, the fact that a WTO Member may take any action to protect ‘essential’ 
interests that ‘it considers necessary’ leaves open the question of whether the use of Article 
XXI is subject to review by a WTO panel.”).  
2015] DECONSTRUCTING WTO CONFORMITY 73 
themselves. This is achieved if Article XVI:4 is interpreted to 
stipulate a ‘correspondence, likeness or agreement’ between domestic 
law and the relevant WTO obligations.”55 In that case the European 
Union was opposed to the United States, which defended a more 
restrictive approach of Article XVI:4 and considered that this Article 
did nothing but confirm the traditional sense of the rule pacta sunt 
servanda.56 According to the European Union,57 “the terms ‘ensure’ 
and ‘conformity,’ taken together in their context, therefore indicate 
that Article XVI:4 obliges Members not merely to give their 
executive authorities formally the right to act consistently with WTO 
law, but to structure their law in a manner that ‘makes certain’ that the 
objectives of the covered agreements will be achieved.”58 Making use 
of the interpretation principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat , i.e., 
the principle of effectiveness, 59  the Panel finally chose the 
interpretation60  of Article XVI:4 provided by the European Union 

55. Panel Report, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 4.370, 
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report]. 
56. One can observe here a difference in the understanding of the principle’s meaning, 
probably caused by the fact that pacta sunt servanda comes from civil law. The role of the 
principle in common law is much more limited. See A. Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A 
Mediation, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 433 (1994). 
57. Before the Treaty of Lisbon took effect on December 1, 2009, the European Union 
did not have the legal capacity to enter into  international agreements. See Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 216-218,  2008 O.J. C 
115/1, for amendments that gave the EU the legal ability to forge international treaties. As of  
December 1, 2009, the WTO officially began using the term “European Union” to refer to 
what had previously been called the European Communities. In order to facilitate the reading 
of this article, the author uses the term “European Union” throughout, even when disputes 
occurred prior to the WTO’s adoption of the term in 2009. The WTO official website which 
reminds that “Before that, ‘European Communities’ was the official name in WTO business 
for legal reasons, and that name continues to appear in older material.” See The European 
Union and The WTO, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/
european_communities_e.htm. 
58. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 4.371. 
59. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat literally translates to: “that the matter may have 
effect rather than fail.” BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1762–1763 (8th ed. 2004). This principle 
implies that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An 
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility. For an application by the Appellate Body 
(“AB”), see Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 26, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
60. In its broadest sense, the principle ut res magis results in “favoring the interpretation 
that would most effectively fulfill the object and purpose of a provision or a treaty.” In this 
light, the principle ut res magis “serves as an adjunct to the teleological approach to treaty 
interpretation.” N. Jansen Calamita, Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the Iranian Nuclear 
Issue, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1393, 1414 n.78 (2009). 
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since the Panel considered that “Article XVI:4, in contrast, not only 
precludes pleading conflicting internal law as a justification for WTO 
inconsistencies, but requires WTO Members actually to ensure the 
conformity of internal law with its WTO obligations.”61 This means 
that in the WTO legal system, Article XVI:4 is not only a 
fundamental and additional principle to govern the relations between 
Members’ domestic laws, regulations, administrative procedures, and 
WTO law, but it also applies over and above the obligation under 
general public international law enshrined in Articles 26 and 27 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
 The legal consequences of the consistency between internal 
legal systems and WTO law are significant. Indeed, Article 27 of the 
VCLT prohibits Members from taking advantage of an internal 
provision to escape their international obligations but it does not hold 
that an internal provision contrary to international law constitutes a 
violation ipso facto. There may, however, be a violation when a 
domestic norm, even non-applied, contradicts WTO law. This is 
precisely the case with the WTO system. It is not new because this 
approach was followed at the time of the GATT 1947. In GATT 
jurisprudence, legislation providing for tax discrimination against 
imported products was, for instance, found to violate the GATT, and 
this was the case even before it had actually been applied to specific 
products, i.e., before any given product had actually been 
discriminated against. 62  As a result, “GATT acquis, confirmed 
in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and recent WTO panel 
reports, make it abundantly clear that legislation as such, 
independently from its application in specific cases, may breach 
GATT/WTO obligations.”63 Article XVI:4 imposes upon Members an 
obligation to take positive measures in adapting their normative 

61. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41 n.652. 
62. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported 
Substances, ¶ 5.2.2, L/6175 (June 5, 1987) (where the legislation imposing the tax 
discrimination only had to be applied by the tax authorities at the end of the year after the 
panel examined the matter); Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and 
Malt Beverages, ¶¶ 5.39, 5.57, 5.60, 5.66, WT/DS23/R (Mar. 16, 1992) (where the legislation 
imposing the discrimination was, for example, not being enforced by the authorities). But see, 
e.g., Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
¶ 84, WT/DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990); Panel Report, EU – Regulation on Imports of Parts and 
Components, ¶¶ 5.25-5.26, L/6657 (Mar. 22, 1990); Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, WT/DS44/R (Aug. 12, 
1994). 
63. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41. 
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system upon the entry into force of the WTO agreements. Even before 
generating a material contradiction between the application of an 
internal rule and a WTO law, the simple absence of conformity 
constitutes a manifest breach of the engagement contained in Article 
XVI:4. The Panel set up for the Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 case thus 
observed that “a Member’s anti-dumping legislation must be 
compatible with the WTO Agreement continuously, whether that 
legislation is applied or not.”64  A given law, independently of its 
application in a precise case—and comparatively without any actual 
damage—can be incompatible with the WTO law as reaffirmed in 
WTO jurisprudence.65 About this, a Panel explains that it is because 
“Article XVI:4, though not expanding the material obligations under 
WTO agreements, expands the type of measures made subject to 
these obligations.”66  
 In other words, by making the three types of measures, i.e., 
Members’ laws, regulations, and administrative procedures, fully 
subject to their obligations imposed in the WTO Agreements, Article 
XVI:4 can thus be applied to the greatest extent possible, not only to a 
given measure in a specific case or dispute. It makes sense especially 
when considering the indirect impact of such a law on economic 
operators who may only be indirect recipients but will ultimately be 
affected by the WTO agreements.67 After all, “in a treaty, the benefits 
of which depend in part on the activity of individual operators[,] the 
legislation itself may be construed as a breach, since the mere 
existence of legislation could have an appreciable ‘chilling effect’ on 
the economic activities of individuals.” 68  Moreover, since the 
majority of complaints are filed not about the controversial 
application of a national rule but rather about the very existence of a 
domestic rule that may constitute a violation of the WTO agreements, 
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64 . Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Complaint by the 
European Communities), ¶ 5.25, WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Complaint by the 
European Communities]. 
65. See Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, 
Apparel and Other Items, ¶¶ 6.45-6.47, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997); Appellate Body Report, 
Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
¶¶ 48-55, WT/DS56/AB/R (Mar. 27, 1998); see also Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 9.124, 9.208, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Panel 
Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ¶ 9.37, 
WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999). 
66. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.41.   
67. See WANG, supra note 19, at 350. 
68. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.81. 
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the amendment of the national law is taken not as a simple means of 
fulfilling a particular obligation but, more significantly, as the object 
of a general obligation. 
 The WTO obligation to comply can be described as a “Pacta 
Plus” obligation as it goes beyond the classic “pacta sunt servanda” 
principle of public international law. As a result, Article XVI:4 has 
two consequences for the relation between domestic law and WTO 
law. First, Members cannot invoke their national law in a negative 
manner to escape an obligation imposed by the international trade 
law. Second, they cannot do so because they are bound by the 
obligation to positively adapt their national law, through 
transformation or creation, whenever their law is contrary to WTO 
law.69 These two consequences shed light on the ultimate objective, 
that is, to remove any conflict between the two legal orders. Hence, 
“Article 27 of the VCLT spells out a negative obligation by 
prohibiting a State from invoking its domestic law to justify any 
departure from its international obligation, while Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement establishes a positive obligation by mandating that 
the State ensures the conformity of such domestic law with its WTO 
obligations.”70 
III. ENFORCING THE WTO OBLIGATION TO COMPLY  
 When the WTO agreements have become effective71 and if a 
Member cannot benefit from any derogation, it must amend its 
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69. This requirement has consequences on the burden of proof in the WTO system. In 
this system, it is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Once the complaining party has done 
so, however, it is for the defending party to submit arguments and sufficient evidence to rebut 
that presumption. Should all arguments and evidence remain in equipoise, the party bearing 
the original burden of proof would lose. What is requested from the defending party in terms 
of evidence is, in a sense, more demanding than that for the complaining party. It makes sense 
when read in relation to Article XVI:4, according to which a WTO Member can only be aware 
of its obligations under WTO law. As a result, a respondent should be able to make a 
demonstration that its domestic measure is not a WTO law violation. See Panel Report, 
European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (Complaint by Australia), ¶ 7.229, 
WT/DS265/R (Oct. 15, 2004). 
70.  Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶¶ 4.31-4.32.  
71 . Since the WTO agreements entered into force on January 1, 1995, founding 
Members were required to bring their law into compliance with the law of the new 
organization. The WTO Members determine the terms and conditions of entry into the WTO 
for the applicant nations, and may allow such countries some leeway in complying with the 
WTO rules. See An Chen, The Three Big Rounds of U.S. Unilateralism Versus WTO 
Multilateralism During the Last Decade: A Combined Analysis of the Great 1994 Sovereignty 
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legislation to conform to the law of the WTO. To that extent, the 
obligation contained in Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement is of 
cardinal importance because a violation of any provision in any WTO 
agreement automatically leads to a violation of Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement.72 Also, since the measure is immediately regarded 
as a breach of Article XVI:4, a DSB Panel has no need to address this 
issue, either, when resolving the dispute between the parties. In order 
to determine the exact nature of the WTO conformity, Section A 
describes why it is necessary to clarify the meaning and objective of 
this principle, and to analyze the different modalities available for 
Member States to adapt their internal law as required by the WTO 
agreements. Consequently, WTO law imposes limitations on 
important authority of its Members, viz., the authority to govern a 
social body that it constitutes. Section B discusses why all WTO 
Members are all bound by the obligation to adapt their legal systems 
to WTO law.  
A. Modalities to Comply 
 First, the effect of the compliance act must be to remove the 
non-conformity, which can be done in two different manners. The 
non-conforming measure can be brought into a state of conformity 
with specified treaty provisions either by withdrawing such measure 
completely,73 or, alternatively by modifying it. One can only assume 

Debate, Section 301 Disputes (1998-2000), and Section 201 Disputes (2002-Present), 17 
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 409, 429 (2003). 
72. See Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to 
Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, ¶ 7.167, 
WT/DS207/RW (Dec. 8, 2006) (“Normally, the determination of a breach of any provision of 
any WTO covered agreement gives automatically rise to a violation of Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement.”). Here reference is made to the Panel in US – 1916 Act (EC) who first 
found that “If Article XVI:4 has any meaning, it is that when a law, regulation or 
administrative procedure of a Member has been found incompatible with the WTO obligations 
of that Member under any agreement annexed to the WTO Agreement, that Member is also in 
breach of its obligations under Article XVI:4.” Complaint by the European Communities, 
supra note 64, ¶ 6.223.  
73 . Under Article 22.1 of the DSU, both “[c]ompensation and suspension of 
concessions” are available to WTO Members as a temporary measure pending compliance by 
a Member found to be in breach of its WTO obligations. See DSU, supra note 3, art. 22.1. 
However, recourse to compensation has rarely been used. See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 
53, at 166-67. The notable exception is the US-EC Copyright dispute where, due to failure to 
reach agreement on the amount of compensation, a WTO Tribunal determined the award to be 
EU€1,219,900 annually. Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Section 110(5) of the US 
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that a WTO Member has the capacity to withdraw or modify a 
domestic rule, precisely because it makes the promise to respect the 
conformity obligation.74 In case of withdrawal, a normative act will 
terminate the non-conforming measure which ceases to exist. In case 
of modification, the measure is amended “by excising or correcting 
the offending portion of the measure involved.”75 This was iteratively 
confirmed in WTO case law.76 
 Second, withdrawal or modification of the non-conforming 
measures raises the question of the legal nature of the domestic act 
which is employed. In this regard, the conformity of domestic law can 
be reached through legislative or infra-legislative norms. The question 
of the nature of the norm which is adopted in order to comply with 
international rules is left to the Member States. The Panel states that 
the 1974 American Law on foreign trade, which predicates the 
adoption of unilateral sanction measures, albeit contrary in essence to 
WTO regulations, is consistent insofar as there is a “licit and 
effective” limitation.77 The latter can be seen in the administrative 
measures laid down by the American Congress at the time the 
Marrakesh Agreement was signed. In fact, the American 
administration can make a decision limiting the discretionary power 
of the Representative on Trade Issues—who can enact unilateral 
measures—in order to comply with WTO regulations. 78  As a 
consequence, there will be as many ways to comply with WTO as 
national variations of legal orders.79 
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Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1, 
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
74. As argued by the US government in the China - Countervailing and Anti-dumping 
Duties case, the obligations under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement are an “evidence of 
China's ability to withdraw the measures at issue.” See Award of the Arbitrator, China – 
Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from 
the United States, ¶ 3.13, WT/DS414/12 (May 3, 2013). 
75. Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides 
and the Import of Finished Leather – Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, ¶ 40, 
WT/DS155/10 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
76. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000, ¶ 49, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). 
77.  Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.25. 
78. Consequently, it is possible for Members to comply with WTO regulations through 
legislative or infra-legislative measures. See Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, Economic Autonomy, 
the United States, and the International Trading System: Representations of a Relationship, 15 
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 651, 662 (2004). 
79. The “[c]onformity can be ensured in different ways in different legal systems . . . 
[o]nly by understanding and respecting the specificities of each Member’s legal system, can a 
correct evaluation of conformity be established.” The Panel further affirms that “[f]requently 
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WTO allows its Members considerable room for maneuver as far 
as the formal conditions of conformity are concerned. In fact, it is not 
obligatory for WTO Members to comply in a determined, 
homogeneous, and formal manner following the enactment of law 
incorporating these rules in their internal legal systems. 80  In this 
regard, WTO conformity quite resembles the EU directives that bind 
Member States to achieving their objectives only within a particular 
time-limit while allowing national governments to choose the form 
and means to be used. Directives have to be implemented within the 
national legal framework in accordance with the procedures laid 
down by individual Member States. As for the EU directives, in the 
WTO compliance process “[i]t is the end result that counts, not the 
manner in which it is achieved,” 81  and the WTO refrains from 
imposing a standard procedure for ensuring conformity.  
B. Substantive Variable  
 The scope of WTO law is considerable. The subject matter 
and instruments addressed by the various WTO agreements cover a 
great number of trade practices. The bulk of agreements, the GATT 
1994 and its side agreements as well as the Schedule of Tariff 
Concessions of each Member,82 deal with trade in physical goods, 
ranging from industrial products to agriculture. The GATS deals with 
all kind of services, often called invisibles. The TRIPs Agreement 
addresses information by defining the demarcation of appropriation, 
exclusive rights, and public availability of information—or its 
expression—which is of crucial importance for producing goods and 
providing services in a competitive environment. The subject matter 
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the Legislator itself does not seek to control, through statute, all covered conduct. Instead it 
delegates to pre-existing or specially created administrative agencies or other public 
authorities, regulatory and supervisory tasks which are to be administered according to certain 
criteria and within discretionary limits set out by the Legislator. The discretion can be wide or 
narrow according to the will of the Legislator.” Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, 
¶ 7.24-7.25. 
80. As stated by Wang, “Members have the freedom to choose their own ways to 
implement their WTO obligations.” See WANG, supra note 19, at 351. 
81. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.24. 
82. A schedule is negotiated for new Members, and schedules of existing Members are 
updated and modified at the end of a multilateral trade round. According to Article II:7, they 
form an integral part of WTO treaty law. In the print version, these schedules comprise about 
30,000 pages for all WTO Members, thus forming the bulk of the system’s legally binding 
texts. 
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as well as instruments may increase as needs are articulated and 
accepted.83  
 WTO conformity obligation never changes in terms of 
severity; what can change is only the explicit and precise nature of the 
norms of reference, as was explained by Hans Kelsen in his General 
Theory of Norms.84 Among these rules, some are of a general nature 
whereas others are much more specific, which may induce variable 
normative intensity into domestic legal orders. When the WTO 
conformity requirement is combined to a loose provision, the Member 
is left with a relatively wide margin of maneuver to comply. In this 
connection, the impact into the domestic order may be relatively mild. 
On the contrary, when the WTO provision is precise, narrow, and 
demanding, the combination with the requirement of conformity will 
be not to leave any flexibility to the Member: the WTO requirement 
will have to be transposed. In this scenario, the impact of the WTO 
may be more tangible in the sense that it substantially affects the 
national law. 
 For example, the fundamental obligation of national treatment 
enshrined in Article III of the GATT allows national authorities a 
wide range of possibilities to conform, from the formal and material 
point of view. One can however, observe that the application and the 
understanding of Article III evolved quite a lot over time according to 
the jurisprudence. Article III:1 of the GATT 1994 establishes a 
general principle according to which internal regulations and taxes 
should not be applied “so as to afford protection to domestic 
production.” It informs, as a chapeau, the following paragraphs of the 
provision: Paragraph 2 stipulates national treatment in relation to 
internal taxes and other internal charges, whereas Paragraph 4 sets out 
the general obligation to accord imported products treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in 
respect of internal laws and regulations affecting the sale and use of 
such products. In regulations explicitly treating domestic and 
imported products differently, a violation of the national treatment 
obligation is obvious since an internal law affecting the sale of 
products, or a tax, on its face has a discriminatory effect. Most 
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83. There are no logical or inherent limits to trade regulation, and it remains a matter of 
political expedience and negotiations, rather than theory and legal classifications, to define the 
scope of WTO law. As much as the WTO deals with intellectual property, it may also do so in 
relation to competition and investment protection. 
84. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS (1991). 
2015] DECONSTRUCTING WTO CONFORMITY 81 
regulations, however, are designed in a neutral and de jure non-
discriminatory manner but nonetheless result in de facto 
discriminatory treatment of imported products.85  
The scope and practical relevance of Article III of the GATT 
1994 is to a large extent dependent on the reading of the term ‘like 
product.’ Its definition essentially sets the benchmark for national 
regulatory freedom to treat certain imported products differently from 
those domestically produced. Not astonishingly, the matter is at the 
heart of the WTO system, and much attention has been paid to it in 
jurisprudence and literature. Over the years, the WTO jurisprudence 
developed a so-called ‘aims-and-effect’ test which was first applied in 
US—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages. 86  An 
assessment of the ‘aims-and-effect’ test in light of the case law allows 
for two conclusions: first, the Appellate Body refused to rely on the 
legislative or regulatory intent for determining likeness under the first 
sentence of Article III:2 of the GATT 1994, as intent is difficult to 
assess in a pluralist political process where regulators pursue 
diverging goals simultaneously. To rely on protectionist effects, 
however, was not denied in the context of assessing the competitive 
relationship of substitutable products, and the test of Article III:1 in 
fine (“so as to afford protection”) fully applies. Second, the Appellate 
Body’s approach in EC – Asbestos with which health risk was 
examined, under Article III:4, as part of the two existing criteria of 
physical product characteristics and the consumers’ tastes and habits, 
implies that a distinction shall not be based on protectionist motives 
and effects. In essence, the Appellate Body implicitly recognized 
what the ‘aims-and-effect’ test seeks to achieve, namely to enlarge the 
governments’ leeway of maneuver in the pursuit of legitimate, non-
protectionist policy goals. 
 Some other WTO agreements, in particular the TRIPs87 and 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement, are full of very detailed provisions. In 
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85. The distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination is often difficult to draw 
and blurred in practice. The problem is related to the scope of protection under national 
treatment. Since the early days of the GATT 1947, the scope of national treatment has been 
read in broad terms and thus has traditionally covered de facto discriminations extensively. See 
Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, L/833 - 7S/60 
(July 15, 1958) (adopted Oct. 23, 1958).  
86. See Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 
DS23/R - 39S/206 (Mar. 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992). 
87. One of the core provisions of the TRIPs Agreement is Article 50, which provides for 
prompt and effective provisional measures. Most actions for infringement, or for unlawful 
importation and distribution by way of parallel trade, are settled by means of such procedures 
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the ADA, in order to prevent the abuse of anti-dumping duty 
proceedings, it is crucial that national anti-dumping authorities 
conduct objective and unbiased investigations and determinations of 
injury to a domestic industry. Therefore, the agreement sets forth 
detailed provisions on the proper establishment and evaluation of the 
facts and evidentiary issues. For instance, Article 18.1 of the ADA 
sets that “specific action against dumping of exports from another 
Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of the 
GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Very soon, the issue 
arose whether a WTO Member is permitted to distribute duties 
assessed pursuant to an anti-dumping duty order—or pursuant to a 
countervailing duty order—to the affected domestic producers for 
qualifying expenditures. The Appellate Body confirmed the panel 
report according to which such a law is a non-permissible “specific 
action against dumping” contrary to Article 18:1 of the ADA.88 
Consequently, as this Article will discuss later, when the DSB 
was called upon to determine the conformity of Indian law with the 
WTO agreements, the claim of violation of certain TRIPs provisions 
in the case India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products was established; not because the 
DSB was more demanding (i.e., the WTO-conformity obligation was 
reinforced), but only because the reference norm was very specific.  
C. Fallback in the Event of Non-Compliance 
 Binding DSB decisions, following fully-fledged dispute 
settlement proceedings, assess legal entitlement in an authoritative 
manner between two or more parties to the specific disputes. They 
leave no doubt as to whether obligations were met or violated. DSB 
decisions are binding upon national authorities and the losing party 
must bring its legislation in line with the DSB decisions.  
 If the losing Member State fails to comply within the period 
of time indicated by the DSB, it has to enter into negotiations with the 
complaining country—or countries—in order to determine mutually 
acceptable compensation: for instance, tariff reductions in areas of 
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and do not reach the stage of ordinary and costly proceedings on the merits. The powers 
granted in Article 50 are of particular importance for trademark and copyright enforcement in 
the field of software protection, as infringements can be easily deleted upon notice of 
impending measures. 
88. Appellate Body Report, US – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
¶ 1023, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003). 
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particular interest to the complaining side. If, after twenty days, no 
satisfactory compensation is agreed upon,89 the complaining side may 
request the DSB for permission to impose limited trade sanctions—
“suspend concessions or obligations”—against the other side. This 
gives the Member imposing authorized countermeasures the right to 
temporarily desist from respecting the conformity of its national law 
to the law of the WTO, vis-à-vis the defaulting Member. However, 
“one of the recognized purposes of countermeasures is to induce the 
defaulting party to comply with DSB recommendations.”90  
 Technically, the DSB authorizes the suspension of 
concessions automatically under the negative consensus rule unless 
the respondent objects, in which case the matter is referred to 
arbitration, normally to the original panel. Actually these procedures 
are really the subject of a new dispute relating to enforcement. The 
DSB should grant this authorization within thirty days of the expiry of 
the “reasonable period of time,” unless there is a consensus against 
this action. In case of suspension of benefits,91 the WTO allows the 
winning party to suspend favorable treatment, or, in simple words, to 
retaliate in case the losing party does not comply with its obligation 
even at the end of the “reasonable period of time.”  
 Materially, the magnitude of any compensation or suspension 
of concessions is required to be equivalent to the level of harm—
nullification or impairment—that is caused by any illegal measure.92 
The extent of retaliation depends on the level of estimated trade loss 
caused by the continued application of WTO-incompatible 
measures.93 In the EU – Hormones (US) case, the Arbitrators stated 
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89. Bryan Mercurio, Improving Dispute Settlement in the WTO: The DSU Review – 
Making It Work?, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 795, 827, 832, 834 (2004). 
90.  Canada – Export Credit and Loan Guarantees, supra note 36, ¶ 3.47. 
91. The procedure for implementing the suspension of concessions includes the drawing-
up and publication of a retaliatory list of products to be targeted by a plaintiff. A respondent 
may object to the list if there is a dispute over the value of the harm or whether the products 
covered conform to the sectoral requirements. 
92. The power of the DSB and, therefore, a Dispute Panel, to authorize the suspension of 
trade concessions by a plaintiff to a respondent where there is harm (nullification or 
impairment), is established in Paragraph 2 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994. This paragraph 
effectively binds Members of the WTO to accepting the rulings of the DSB and, also, where 
appropriate, for the DSB to permit sanctions against countries found to be acting contrary to 
the WTO rules. 
93 . See, e.g., Decision by the Arbitrator, EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/ARB (July 12, 1999) [hereinafter EC Measures Concerning 
Meat]. In the beef hormone dispute, arbitration established that the annual value of trade 
affected by these measures was CAN$11.3 million for Canada and US$116.8 million for the 
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that the minimum requirements attached to a request to suspend 
concessions or other obligations are: “(1) the request must set out a 
specific level of suspension, i.e., a level equivalent to the nullification 
and impairment caused by the WTO-inconsistent measure, pursuant 
to Article 22.4; and (2) the request must specify the agreement and 
sector(s) under which concessions or other obligations would be 
suspended, pursuant to Article 22.3.”94  
In regards to compliance, countermeasures seem to be the last 
chance to force Members to respect the conformity obligation.95 In the 
event of failure to comply with the initial obligations of conformity, 
despite all reminders and negotiations, the defaulting Member will, as 
a last resort, become the target of a countermeasure, because non-
compliance is the very event justifying the adoption of 
countermeasures. It is only when the illicit fact is noted that the 
authority to react to it can be granted to the injured Member because 
“authorization by the DSB of the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations presupposes the existence of a failure to comply with the 
recommendations or rulings contained in panel and/or Appellate Body 
reports as adopted by the DSB.”96  
IV. LITIGATING ON COMPLIANCE 
The dispute settlement practice followed by the WTO since 1995 
shows that the purpose of judicial organs responsible for resolving 
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United States. Id. ¶ 83. This represents only a small fraction of the total value of the 
transatlantic beef trade. In the banana dispute, the initial claim for the suspension of 
concessions by the United States was for US$520 million, but this was reduced to US$191.4 
million after arbitration. See Trachtman, supra note 2, at 662. In the same dispute, the 
Arbitration Panel awarded Ecuador sanctions worth US$201.6 million, substantially greater 
than the annual value of its imports from the EU. In the case of the recent steel dispute, the EU 
estimated that the lost value of its trade concessions as a result of US restrictions on steel 
imports was some US$3 billion (EU€2.407 billion) per annum. 
94. EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), supra note 17, ¶ 16.  
95. Where disputes are between unequal trade partners, it may be counterproductive to 
resort to suspension of concessions as the last resort. See generally Bryan Mercurio, Why 
Compensation Cannot Replace Trade Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 318 (2009) [hereinafter Trade Retaliation in the WTO 
DSU]. The significantly weaker injured Member may not be able to hurt the defaulting party. 
The sanctions may actually harm the injured Member further, while the economic effects on 
the defaulting party may be negligible. Thus, the final remedy of countermeasures may in 
certain cases be ineffective in fulfilling its recognized purpose of inducing the defaulting party 
to comply with DSB recommendations. Id.  
96. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 4.4, WT/DS27/ARB (Apr. 9, 1999). 
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disputes is a reminder of the legality, rather than the protection of 
particular interests, of the contracting governments. Its intrinsic 
dynamism has led the WTO and its organs to judge matters of prime 
importance in sectors that seem to bear no relation to trade, but whose 
solution is essential for the natural expansion of its goals. 97  In 
addition, the author agrees with Mercurio that “the DSU, as written 
and interpreted, does not have clear aims and objectives (beyond 
simply resolving the dispute),” 98  but believes that its aims and 
objectives can be understood if the DSU is read in relation to the 
WTO Agreement. 
 As clearly as the obligation to comply may be asserted in the 
WTO legal system, violations of the rules do occur, be they based on 
deliberate actions, wrong interpretations, etc. What is relevant to the 
compliance process is to look at how the WTO “judges” contribute to 
ensuring the respect of this central obligation to comply.99  
 DSM, a central feature of the WTO, has had an enormous 
impact on the world trade system and trade diplomacy, and it 
principally deals with questions related to the conformity of domestic 
law with the WTO agreements. The DSB has to carry on the difficult 
task of determining the conformity of a domestic legal order with 
WTO law.100 Once the DSB makes a decision, its ruling is binding 
and there is a legal obligation to comply with the ruling.101 Although 
no other WTO agreements have generated as much interest as the 
DSU, this Article will not go into the details of the general DSU 

97. See Carla L. Reyes, WTO-Compliant Protection of Fundamental Rights: Lessons 
from the EU Privacy Directive, 12 MELB. J. INT'L L. 141, 163-66 (2011) (discussing regulatory 
restraints on privacy protection under the WTO). 
98. Trade Retaliation in the WTO DSU, supra note 95. 
99. The WTO has two major functions: legislative and judicial. The legislative function 
refers to the role of the WTO as a forum in which sovereign Members seek to reach trade 
agreements. The judicial function is performed by the WTO’s dispute settlement system, 
which is one of the major features of this multilateral trade system. However, since the long 
stalemate in multilateral negotiations has put WTO’s legislative function in low gear while the 
judicial arm keeps doing its job, the implementation of WTO law has largely taken the form of 
compliance with the rulings of the DSB. These rulings, in effect, have facilitated the system at 
the center of trade regulation. Even so, there is no focused conceptual analysis of why the 
WTO has been so efficient in enforcing its rules and compelling Members to proceed with in-
depth amendments to their domestic law. 
100. The DSU is “a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system.” DSU, supra note 3, art. 3(2).  
101. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 109–25. 
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mechanism,102 but Section A concentrates on the standard of review 
adopted by the Panels and the AB in order to explain in Section B the 
ramifications of the nature of national legislation on the compliance 
process. 
A. Standard of Review 
 This Article would like to highlight that when the WTO 
provision underlying the control is more precise, the examination by 
the DSB of the contested national measures is less likely to use the de 
novo approach. Inversely, when the WTO provision is not very 
precise, the DSB will have to examine the context of the national 
measures more thoroughly in order to assess its conformity.  
 As mentioned, conformity within the framework of the WTO 
system imposes on each Member the obligation to include in its legal 
system the rules contained in the WTO agreements because this 
process is of an obligatory nature. To that extent, the conformity 
determination by the DSB consists of analyzing whether the contested 
measures are consistent with WTO law or not. The role of the Panels 
and the AB is to determine whether the national measures conform to 
WTO law.103 “The verb ‘to determine’ means to find out, to ascertain, 
to establish, or to carry out all those activities necessary to reach a 
reasoned decision.”104 Such a determination can be done through a 
text-to-text comparison of the domestic legislation with the relevant 
WTO provisions or through a comparison of the WTO provision with 
the administrative practice.  
 In practice, when the examination of an allegedly WTO-
inconsistent domestic measure or law falls within the competence of a 

102. The efficiency of the GATT’s DSM was limited because it was necessary to obtain 
a general consensus for adopting a report of a dispute settlement panel, and the foreseeable 
refusal of a succumbing party was sufficient to prevent the adoption of the report. Under the 
WTO, the GATT consensus requirement has been reversed: according to its DSU, a consensus 
is required to reject a report (called “negative consensus”), rather than to adopt one. In other 
words, a decision will be taken if any Member votes for it. The result of this reversal can be 
seen in the quasi-automatic nature of the process. For a comprehensive overview, see SIMON 
LESTER ET AL., WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 234 (2008). 
103. Petros Mavroidis argues that WTO DSB organs, including panels and the AB, have 
broad discretion to establish procedures necessary to fulfill their functions. See Petros C. 
Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts, 102 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 421, 424 (2008). 
104 . Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶ 24, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 
28, 2002). 
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panel, the question arises with what depth or intensity it should be 
reviewed. The standard of review deemed appropriate in a specific 
case defines the degree to which a panel should ‘second guess’ a 
Member’s measure or law. 105  Again, the DSU does not directly 
address this issue.106  
 The DSB, however, may face a problem when it has to deal 
with determinations already made by national governments. Because 
“the issue of standard of review [will arise] where a panel is 
examining the domestic law of a Member as interpreted by domestic 
authorities and tribunals to determine whether the law, or the actions 
of those authorities and tribunals (including fact-finding), or both are 
in compliance with provisions of the covered agreements.”107 Since 
the WTO Agreements remain silent on the proper standard of review, 
traditionally, the standard of review may be oriented in two opposite 
directions according to the deference principle and the de novo 
principle. 108  However, considering jurisprudence on the whole, it 
shows that the panels and the AB have opted for “a middle-of-the-
road approach and have applied a test which is a mixture of these two 
principles depending on the particulars of the case concerned.”109  
B. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Legislation 
 But there is still a limit in the role of the DSB regarding the 
determination of WTO conformity. According to the DSB 
jurisprudence, there is a clear distinction between mandatory 
legislation and discretionary legislation. As underscored by Wang, 

105. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L ECON. 
L. 635, 637 (2003). 
106. The Anti-Dumping (“AD”) Agreement is the only agreement for which specific 
standards of review of both facts and law could be agreed upon during the Uruguay Round. 
GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article VI, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
107. ROBERT HOWSE & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE  194 (Routledge) (1999); see SIMON LESTER, BRYAN MERCURIO & ARWEL DAVIES. 
WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 206-10 (2d ed. 2012). 
108. An illustration of the de novo approach is the Thailand – Anti-dumping duties case 
in which the AB held that panels are given a broad authority to investigate whether the anti-
dumping authority of a Member properly performed fact-finding, and suggested that it could 
examine not only the evidence before the anti-dumping authority but also other evidence. 
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on – Angles, Shapes and Sections of 
Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, ¶ 107 WT/DS122/AB/R, (Mar. 12,2001). 
109. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 53, at 42. 
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“government measures (including laws, regulations and 
administrative actions) which leave no discretion to enforcement 
authorities are capable of violating international treaties.”110  
 Mandatory law is law that is enforceable on its own and its 
implementation does not allow the executive authority any room for 
maneuver. Also, mandatory law that does not contain provisions in 
conformity with WTO law automatically violates the organization’s 
rules. Conversely, discretionary law allows the executive authority 
room for maneuver through administrative action. It leaves the 
authorities room to maneuver and enables them to remove from the 
law provisions that are in conflict with WTO rules and to adopt 
measures that are in conformity with international trade requirements. 
Thus, these discretionary laws do not by themselves constitute a 
violation of the WTO agreements and they are called into question 
only if, at the time of their actual application in a particular case, they 
violate the terms of the WTO Agreement, as underlined by a Panel 
report: “legislation which merely gives the executive authority the 
discretion, either through silence or otherwise, to act inconsistently 
with the Agreement cannot as such be challenged before a Panel, i.e., 
independent of its actual application in a particular case.”111 Even so, 
it is not tenable that the question of the WTO conformity of a 
domestic law with a Member’s WTO obligations may not form a 
subject matter of that assessment independently of its application. It is 
a significant limit imposed on the general principle of the conformity 
obligation.  
 The origin of this distinction goes back to the GATT 1947, 
and the action of the GATT panels was summarized as follows in the 
United States – Tobacco case: “panels had consistently ruled that 
legislation which mandated action inconsistent with the General 
Agreement could be challenged as such, whereas legislation which 
merely gave the discretion to the executive authority [ . . . ] to act 
inconsistently with the General Agreement could not be challenged as 
such; only the actual application of such legislation inconsistent with 
the General Agreement could be subject to challenge.”112  

110. WANG, supra note 19, at 351. 
111. Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 7.129, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002). 
112. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and 
Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, B.I.S.D. 41S/131  (Oct. 4, 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 The purpose of this distinction was to make it possible to 
determine “when legislation as such—rather than a specific 
application of that legislation—was inconsistent with a Contracting 
Party’s GATT 1947 obligations.” 113  In any event, “the relevant 
discretion, for purposes of distinguishing between mandatory and 
discretionary legislation, is a discretion vested in the executive 
branch of government.”114  
 The opening offered by the concept of discretionary 
legislation, however, has recently been reduced by jurisprudence. It is 
considered that the freedom allowed to national authorities to act in a 
way incompatible with WTO agreements could amount to a violation 
of these agreements, after all. In other words, a distinction is 
maintained between mandatory and discretionary legislation, 
according to which only the latter requires a WTO-inconsistent 
application to violate WTO rules. This is in reference to a 
development of an important case of 1999 regarding Sections 301–
310 of the Trade Act of 1974, in which the panel advanced several 
arguments that are sometimes considered as indecisive, and thus it led 
Yoshiko Naiki 115  to comment that “impressionist may be an 
appropriate description of the panel’s way of speaking.” In that case, 
a US law authorized the US authorities, without any obligation on 
their part, to unilaterally sanction a pled violation of WTO law by 
another Member. However, the Panel considered that the US law, 
whether the freedom it allows to the Administration is exerted or not, 
constitutes a violation of the WTO agreements.  
 Although, with some criticism one can imagine that if the 
panel had admitted the compatibility of the US law, it would have left 
a permanent doubt about the viability of the DSM. Also, such a doubt 
would have implied significant legal risks for economic operators 
who are the principal actors even though they may not be the 
immediate recipients of benefits under the WTO law. If individual 
economic operators cannot be confident about the integrity of WTO 
dispute resolution and may fear unilateral measures outside the 
guarantees and disciplines which the DSU ensures, their confidence in 
each and every one of the substantive rules of the system will be 

113 . Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 88, 
WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R (Aug. 28, 2000). 
114. Id. ¶ 89. 
115. Yoshiko Naiki, The Mandatory Discretionary Doctrine in WTO Law – The US – 
Section 301 Case and Its Aftermath, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 23, 36 (2004). 
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undermined as well. “The overall systemic damage and the denial of 
benefits would be amplified accordingly. The assurances thus given 
under the DSU may [ . . . ] be of even greater importance than those 
provided under substantive WTO provisions.”116  
 In any case, the general principle of conformity gains 
importance especially when there is concern about the indirect effects 
of discretionary legislation on economic operators. This kind of limit 
imposed by the distinction between mandatory legislation and 
discretionary legislation is however relative. Primarily, because it 
relates to the application and respect of an Article of the DSM which 
determines the settlement of the disputes that the Panel regards as 
fundamental, noting in addition that “the preservation of the specific 
guarantees provided for in Article 23 is of added importance given the 
spill-over effect they have on all material WTO rights and 
obligations.”117  
 Insistence on discretionary legislation despite nonconformity 
with WTO rules, among other things, will pose a problem, that is, to 
continue to leave Members exposed to the risk of violation. Such a 
situation undermines the safety and predictability of trade, and it is 
difficult to reconcile it with the obligation to ensure conformity. After 
all, when the law leaves room for violation, conformity is unlikely to 
be guaranteed. Furthermore, the increasing number of cases raising 
the issue of mandatory/discretionary legislation can demonstrate that 
more and more complainants base their arguments on this theory in an 
attempt to eliminate other Members’ illegal administrative 
practices.118  
 This Article thus would like to point out an issue: if the 
discretionary legislation can persist even after the implementation of 
its measures has been disapproved, it may encourage the use of this 
legislation as a protectionist tool. Indeed, as long as it continues, it 
may become an incentive to enact some measures that are contrary to 
the WTO rules. About this issue, without calling into question the 
concept of discretionary legislation, the Japanese representatives, 
however, proposed making an exception to the application of the 
theory of discretionary legislation as the repetition of the same 
infringement is highly probable: “[F]or instance, when it was evident 
that a Member had deliberately ignored the recommendation of the 

116. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 55, ¶ 7.94. 
117. See id. 
118. Naiki, supra note 115, at 63. 
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DSB not to apply a particular measure enacted pursuant to the law 
and applied similar measures subsequently.”119 Meanwhile, they also 
suggested that the burden of proof in cases involving “discretionary” 
law should be shifted to the Member imposing such measures, if there 
was evidence that repeated violation had taken place. In such 
situations, the measures would be presumed to be inconsistent with 
the WTO rules, unless proven otherwise.  
V. NOVATION OF THE COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION 
In the early days of the WTO, Professor Petros C. Mavroidis 
conjectured that the then-newly penned DSU could theoretically 
allow “hit and run”-style breach. 120  When deconstructing the 
obligation of conformity, I would rather emphasize a peculiar 
phenomenon which shed a great light of the WTO compliance 
process, consisting of the novation of the obligation of conformity.  
 The absence of conformity leads the DSB to specify the 
contents of the primary obligation by the creation of a derived 
obligation.121 This new obligation specifies the content of the primary 
obligation: such internal rules must comply with the provisions of the 
WTO agreements. The DSB reports isolate the non-conformity 
measures and the reasons for their non-conformity. They also locate 
the exact point where the international obligation must be applied in 
the internal legal system. Conceptually, a secondary obligation 
contained in the decision of the DSB—which requires the law to 
conform to WTO law—is grafted to treaty obligations to ensure 
compliance. So there is a novation of the primary obligation to 
comply. Section A will discuss the interpretation given by the DSB 
reports and how it transforms the initial requirement in its form, and 
Section B will discuss how it transforms the substantive content. 

119.  DSU Special Session, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
13 – 15 November 2002, ¶ 3, TN/DS/M/6 (Mar. 31, 2003). 
120. Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763, 783 (2000). Professor John Jackson applied the phrase 
“free pass” in 2008, pointing to the “compliance incentive problem” but leaving that problem's 
resolution for another day. See John H. Jackson, The Case of the World Trade Organization, 
84 INT'L. AFF. 437, 452 (2008) (applying the term “free pass” to the time lag). 
121. The reasons that the adopted reports of a panel or the AB bind the parties to the 
dispute are proclaimed in the DSU Agreement. According to Jackson, there are at least 11 
clauses, which strongly suggest that “[T]he legal effect of an adopted panel report is the 
international law obligation to perform the recommendation of the panel report.” JOHN H. 
JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 783 (2000). 
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A. Transformations in the Form of the Obligation 
 The primary obligation to comply is the vector of the DSB 
determination of compliance. When a non-conforming measure is 
identified, the DSB ruling will require its compliance by either 
withdrawal or modification. The DSB ruling generates a new 
obligation to comply which is distinct from the primary one. First, the 
secondary obligation is now emanating from the specific body of the 
WTO, which makes it unilateral in nature. Second, the compliance of 
the losing party is now subject to a deadline which never existed 
earlier.  
 First, originally from a conventional source, the compliance 
obligation is turned into a unilateral act when later made in a report 
adopted by the DSB. The DSB, composed of all WTO Members, 
exercises the powers of the General Council and performs the 
functions of dispute resolution. It is only when the report has been 
formally adopted by the DSB that it expresses the will of the WTO to 
force compliance of domestic law. If the report is not adopted—or as 
long as it has not been adopted— the findings of a panel or Appellate 
Body reports have no legal status in the WTO. This reformulation of 
the obligation to comply in a unilateral act does not carry an increased 
strength of the obligation. However, it comes back directly to the 
Member concerned as it shall respect the commitment contained in 
Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.  
In essence, the DSM goes beyond Article XVI:4 because a 
Member is no longer free to decide how it should act but has to follow 
the collective ruling against it. More precisely, if the obligation 
resulting from the treaty expects the Member to ensure the conformity 
of its domestic law, the obligation resulting from the DSB report 
instructs the Member how to bring its measures into conformity with 
the WTO law. In this respect, spontaneous execution has become a 
directed execution of the treaty. Second, a deadline for the 
compliance appears in the DSB ruling. DSU Article 21.1 states the 
general principle that “[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or 
rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution 
of disputes to the benefit of all Members.”122 Accordingly, Members 

122. This requirement is specified in Article 21.3 of the DSU providing that “[i]f it is 
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and rulings, the Member 
concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.” DSU, art. 21.3. 
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should seek to comply “immediately” with the recommendations and 
rulings of the DSB.  
 It is only if it is “impossible” that the Member concerned is 
entitled to a “reasonable time” for implementation. In determining the 
reasonable period of time, the Arbitrator will have to look at the 
regulatory means available in the domestic legal order. Only then 
does it become possible to define the shortest period possible within 
the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations 
and rulings of the DSB.123 In considering the case of whether it “is 
impracticable to comply immediately with the recommendations and 
rulings,” WTO law gives up the initial requirement of immediate 
compliance. However, it is not an abandonment of the compliance 
obligation itself. Instead, the WTO adopts a pragmatic position by 
balancing the need for compliance and the time more or less that can 
help reach compliance.  
 In other words, WTO law tolerates that in certain 
circumstances it is not possible to immediately meet the requirement 
of compliance. In this light, the secondary obligation to comply 
involves a reduction of Article XVI:4 primary obligation to comply. 
The introduction of a prompt compliance or the tolerance of a 
“reasonable period of time”124 have a point in common: they both 
imply the emergence of a deadline. The obligation to comply thus 
undergoes another transformation in terms of the time that is given to 
the Member to change its law. Indeed, the secondary obligation sets 
the time at which the Member will have the obligation to conform to 
WTO law.  
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123. EC Measures Concerning Meat, supra note 93, at ¶ 16. The Arbitrators held, inter 
alia, that “when implementation can be effected by administrative means, the reasonable 
period of time should be considerably shorter than 15 months.” Further:  
[T]he ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 21.3(c) indicates that 15 
months is a ‘guideline for the arbitrator’, and not a rule. This guideline is 
stated expressly to be that ‘the reasonable period of time . . . should not exceed 
15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. In 
other words, the 15-month guideline is an outer limit or a maximum in the 
usual case. For example, when implementation can be effected by 
administrative means, the reasonable period of time should be considerably 
shorter than 15 months. However, the reasonable period of time could be 
shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances, as specified in 
Article 21.3(c).  
Id. 
124. DSU, art. 21.3. 
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B. Transformations of the Content of the Obligation  
 The obligation to comply also changes in its substantive 
content since the DSB decision specifies the content of the primary 
obligation and sometimes indicates the means to achieve conformity 
of domestic law with the law of the WTO. 
 The obligation of compliance with WTO law, enshrined in the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, is general in nature. It applies to 
all agreements annexed, which explicitly or implicitly state so. 
However, a dispute raised before the DSB is always about an alleged 
contradiction between a treaty provision and a precise and specific 
internal measure. The role of the Panel or the Appellate Body consists 
of determining compliance of a specific domestic rule with a specific 
WTO law requirement. The report isolates the non-conforming 
measure and the reasons for its non-compliance. The DSB ruling 
identifies the point where the international obligation should apply in 
the internal legal order. The secondary obligation to comply is a new 
obligation which specifies the content of the primary obligation: such 
internal rules 125  must comply with the provisions of the WTO 
agreements. 126  In this sense, the secondary obligation clarifies the 
primary obligation of Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. In this 
respect, the words show that the Member is no longer master of the 
treaty. Indeed, if the obligation under the Treaty requires “the 
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that 
agreement.” While the primary obligation to comply involves an 
accepted and spontaneous enforcement, the secondary obligation 
execution carries an enforcement supervised by the DSB. 
 Generally, the requirement of Article XVI:4 of the WTO 
Agreement does not prescribe any particular legal technique to 
perform compliance.127 However, the DSB may employ the ability to 
suggest some means of enforcement of the obligation to comply 
which is an authoritative opportunity there may be to exercise is left 
to the discretion of the panel or the AB.128 According to Article 19:1 

125 . See, e.g., Panel Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India Panel Report]. 
126. In this case, TRIPs art. 70.8(a). 
127. Consequently, Members have a real autonomy to conduct compliance of their 
normative spaces. This principle is not questioned when the DSB adopts the decision to 
require a Member to change an internal measure to comply with its obligations.  
128. Some authors are favorable and encouraging. Y. Fukunaga, Securing Compliance 
Through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations, 9 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 383, 400 (2006) (“As long as the complaining party specifies a certain way in 
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of the DSU,129 when a panel or the AB concludes that “a measure is 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the 
Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that 
agreement.” Meanwhile, the panel or AB “may suggest ways in which 
the Member concerned could implement the recommendations”130 and 
could bring the measure into accordance with that agreement. This 
provision has been interpreted by the panel according to which:  
Article 19.1 appears to envisage suggestions regarding what 
could be done to a measure to bring it into conformity or, in case 
of a recommendation under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, 
what could be done to ‘withdraw’ the prohibited subsidy. It is not 
clear if Article 19.1 also addresses issues of surveillance of those 
steps. That said, any agreement that WTO Members might reach 
among themselves to improve transparency regarding the 
implementation of WTO obligations can only be encouraged.131  
There are some instances of DSB Reports making such substantive 
recommendations. Thus, the Panel in Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products suggested to 
India and the United States that they should negotiate a phase-out 
period for the offending restrictions.132 In another case, the United 
States requested that the Panel suggest to India that it should 
implement its obligation in the same way as Pakistan had 
implemented its obligation under TRIPs by establishing a mechanism 
to protect patent applications during a transitional period. The Panel 
formally declined this demand, saying that it would impair India’s 
right to choose how to implement, but discreetly added that “India 
should take into account the interests of those persons who would 
have filed patent applications had an appropriate mechanism been 
maintained.”133 In a sense, Article 19.1 of the DSU reinforces the 
requirement of conformity as indicated by how materially the losing 

which the DSB recommendations can be implemented, it would be preferable to encourage a 
panel to assess the specified way and, if appropriate, to suggest the specified way as a valid 
implementation option, with an explicit statement that there may exist other effective ways to 
implement the DSB recommendations.”). 
129. DSU, art. 19.1 (“In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body 
may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.”). 
130. See id. 
131. Panel  Report,  Brazil  –  Export  Financing  Programme  for  Aircraft,  ¶ 7.3, 
WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000). 
132. Panel Report, Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products, ¶ 7.7, WT/DS90/R (Apr. 6, 1999). 
133. See India Panel Report, supra note 125, ¶ 8.2. 
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party can comply, i.e., modify and correct the domestic measure. Of 
course, such a material suggestion is not binding on the Member, 
however, when the Member concerned follows a suggestion of a 
Panel or the AB, its action would be seen as being de facto in 
compliance with any provision of Article 21:5 of the DSU reviewed 
by that tribunal which is an incentive for the losing party to take the 
suggestion.134  
CONCLUSION 
 In light of the WTO’s massive impact on domestic legal 
systems and its great influence, the topic of conformity of domestic 
law with WTO law has become a systemic issue that goes to the core 
and raisons d’être of the multilateral trading system. Also, this 
impressive compliance over the years must reinforce the Members’ 
will to obtain the best results possible during the present negotiations. 
Any new agreement will benefit from the WTO-conformity principle. 
In this respect, each new engagement should be considered in light of 
the changes it implies for domestic law. These changes have 
consequences for the economic sector and also have social 
repercussions, which should be the countries’ main preoccupation. 
 The WTO compliance obligation is not absolute as it has a 
few limits.135 In addition, the DSB is in fact a restatement of the initial 
obligation of compliance without imposing a sanction which would 
cover the period during which an internal rule existed in opposition to 
WTO law. In reality, the multilateral trading system does not seek 
absolute compliance with WTO law, or even to repair the lack of 
conformity. The WTO system only wants the law to not permanently 
impede the implementation of the treaty commitments.   
 The obligation to conform on the basis of a DSB report does 
not invalidate the conformity obligation in the agreement. However, 
even though the primary rule remains valid, only the compliance ex 
nunc as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time for compliance 
with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB is 
required. The non-fulfillment of the initial obligation is invalidated by 
the execution of the treaty and there is no attempt to examine the 

134. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION –  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 299 (2004). 
135. Especially in terms of tolerance reserved for dispositive law. 
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reasons for its non-fulfillment. In other words, only the suspension of 
the illicit act is essential.136  
 In the WTO compliance process, the defaulting Member is 
thus only asked to fulfill his initial obligation without being held 
responsible for remedying the consequences of his illegal action. In 
essence, the Member is only expected to do what he was initially 
supposed to but not at the time when it should have been done in the 
first place, which is however a basic principle of both domestic law 
and international law.137 In a strict sense, the Member does not have 
to answer for the breach of the obligation, but rather is only expected 
to put an end to it. Neither compensation nor the suspension of 
concessions can be applied retrospectively, and, in essence WTO 
views remedies as being only prospective and not retrospective.138 
This means that there is no recompense for any harm caused by an 
illegal trade measure prior to and during the implementation of 
dispute procedures. Also, it means that the action of the defaulting 
State cannot be punished.139 The DSB does not take into account the 
damage already caused and gives more importance to the future 
execution of the treaty.  
 Conceptually, non-observance of the primary obligation does 
not entail a secondary obligation to remedy the failure to act, but 

136. As the Arbitrators have said, “language used throughout the DSU demonstrates that 
when a Member’s measure has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO Agreement, the 
Member’s obligation extends only to providing prospective relief, and not to remedying past 
transgressions.” Panel Report, United States – Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act, ¶ 3.87, WT/DS221/R (July 15, 2002) [hereinafter Panel Report United States 
– Section 129(c)(1)]. 
137. As stated in 1928 by the Permanent International Court of Justice in the Chorzow 
Factory case, because “[T]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act 
(a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals) is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed.” Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶ 125 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow Factory]. 
138. As Petros Mavroidis states, “WTO practice suggests that, contrary to what is the 
case in customary international law, damages will be calculated from the end of the 
implementation period and not from the earlier moment when the illegality occurred.” 
Mavroidis, supra note 103, at 438. Public international law approach to remedies was set out 
in the 1928 Chorzow Factory decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See 
Chorzow Factory, supra note 137. 
139. In this regard, the Arbitrators have said that “a countermeasure becomes punitive 
when it is not only intended to ensure that the State in breach of its obligations brings its 
conduct into conformity with its international obligations, but contains an additional dimension 
meant to sanction the action of that State.” See Panel Report United States – Section 129(c)(1), 
supra note 136. 
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rather a secondary obligation in the form of a reminder to comply 
with the primary obligation. Even more fascinating, the primary 
obligation of similarity is replaced by a secondary obligation of 
proximity, and the DSB decision is controlled by fixing a threshold of 
compatibility.  
Compliance with WTO law cannot be explained by the existence 
of a mere obligation to comply. Actually, this obligation to comply 
generates complex transnational legal processes which even modify 
the initial obligation. The distinctive feature of the WTO settlement 
system does not lay in a vertical obligation which would force 
Members to comply. This is just an illusion because such a rigid 
framework does not actually exist in the law of the Organization. 
However, once deconstructed, the obligation of conformity reveals a 
complex mutation which generates a process. In that process, 
Members are enmeshed in procedural requirements and successive 
exchanges which gradually show them how they can align their laws 
and policies with international rules. Until the adoption of 
countermeasures, everything in the WTO Dispute Settlement process 
smoothly converges in just one direction, in other words, ensuring the 
execution of the WTO Agreement and consequently, the compliance 
of the national law.  
 So when one reads that compliance with DSB is high, it is a 
forced perspective. Indeed, if there is a ruling of noncompliance, it 
means that one Member did not respect the initial obligation. Instead 
of looking at the past, the WTO, very pragmatically, reformulates a 
secondary obligation which this time must be enforced. One may 
criticize WTO as not implementing a full-fledged law of 
responsibility, but results over past decades speak stunningly to the 
contrary. 
